

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NIC-01 ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 EB-11 OMB-01

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PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 /149 W

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R 051731Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4212

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 12342

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, WB, GE, US, UK, UR, FR

SUBJECT: THE FEA AND BERLIN ACCESS -- A DEMI-SEMI-CRISIS

SUMMARY: THE FEA-RELATED CRISIS ON BERLIN ACCESS SEEMS TO HAVE RUN ITS APPOINTED COURSE. IT HAS BEEN A SET-PIECE AFFAIR, WITH THE RUSSIANS RUNNING IT FOR LIMITED, CLEARLY DEFINED AIMS. THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVES, AND THE PRECEDENTS THEY AND THE EAST GERMANS HAVE CREATED COULD GIVE US TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE. THE "CRISIS" PROVES WHAT WAS ALREADY CLEAR, NAMELY THAT THE BERLIN AGREEMENT IS NOT SELF-ENFORCING BUT RESTS ULTIMATELY FOR ITS EFFECTIVENESS ON SOVIET GOOD WILL -- NOT EXACTLY A PREDICTABLE CONSTANT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. AS THIS MESSAGE IS BEING WRITTEN, IT SEEMS THAT THE FEA-RELATED "CRISIS" IS BEING WOUND UP BY THE EAST. WHEN THE TRANSIT COMMISSION MEETS AUGUST 6, THE EAST GERMANS WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE TACK, WHY ALL THE FUSS? IT WILL HAVE BEEN SOME DAYS SINCE TRAVELERS WERE  
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LAST QUESTIONED AND DELAYED, AND THERE WILL HAVE BEEN

ONLY ONE CASE OF ACTUAL TURNBACK, THAT OF THE FEA OFFICIAL WITH THE UNLIKELY NAME NORBERT-NIDGER VON NIEDING. THE FIFTY OR SO CASES OF QUESTIONING AND DELAY OF TRAVELERS AND THE NIEDING TURNBACK CAN BE SET AGAINST THE COMPLETELY UNIMPEDED TRAVEL OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF AUTOBAHN USERS

THE COMMISSION MEETING DOES NOT PROMISE TO BE VERY ENLIGHTENING OR CONCLUSIVE. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THEIR LIMITED NATURE -- AND ALSO SOME LOW COMEDY ASPECTS (IT IS DIFFICULT TO TAKE A "CRISIS" TOO SERIOUSLY THAT BEGINS BY THE STOPPING OF A TRUCK CARRYING A LOAD OF SAUSAGE AND THE QUESTIONING OF ITS DRIVER AS TO POSSIBLE FEA AFFILIATION) -- THE FEA-RELATED INCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS MARGINAL. PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR AND POLICY EMERGED WHICH, WHILE NOT AMOUNTING TO A NEW REVELATION, DESERVE ATTENTION.

2. THE RUSSIAN PERFORMANCE WAS CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET. THE SOVIET EMBASSY HERE HAS TOLD US THAT THE FEA BOTHERED THEM BECAUSE IF THEY LET THE FRG GET AWAY WITH IT SCOT FREE, THE WEST GERMANS, INSATIABLE BY NATURE, WOULD MOVE AHEAD AND PLANT FURTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN BERLIN. IT WAS BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED, THE THREE WESTERN POWERS INCLUDED, THE RUSSIANS SAY, TO DRAW A LINE EARLY IN THE GAME WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING OTHER, MORE SERIOUS TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE. THE RUSSIANS MADE THE POINT, WHICH COMES UP FROM TIME TO TIME, THAT THE THREE POWERS HAD WELCHED ON A COMMITMENT MADE TO THEM DURING THE QUADRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BERLIN AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INCREASE IN FEDERAL PRESENCE. THE RUSSIANS ALSO TOLD US, AS THEY HAD MADE KNOWN ELSEWHERE, THAT THE FEA-RELATED STOPPAGES WOULD BE A LIMITED AFFAIR THAT WOULD PASS QUICKLY AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNDULY SERIOUSLY IN THE WEST.

3. THE WEST GERMAN PERFORMANCE WAS MANY SPLENDORED. THEY BLEW HOT AND COLD THROUGHOUT THE "CRISIS". THEIR SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING GENSCHER, WERE QUOTED TO THE EFFECT THAT WHILE THE ACCESS INCIDENTS WERE A VERY CONFIDENTIAL

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SERIOUS BUSINESS, THERE WAS NO WISH ON THE FRG SIDE TO ESCALATE. HINTS WERE THROWN OUT FROM TIME TO TIME OF POSSIBLY UNTOWARD EFFECTS OF THE "CRISIS" ON CSCE. SOME PRESS VOICES EVEN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF FRG RETALIATORY ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON THE GDR. IT WAS PRETTY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS HUFFING AND PUFFING WAS MOSTLY FOR THE RECORD. THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE "CRISIS," OF A GROMYKO VISIT TO BONN IN

MID SEPTEMBER, SHOWED CLEARLY THAT BERLIN TRAFFIC PROBLEMS WERE NOT GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO GET IN THE WAY OF THE MAIN LINES OF GERMAN POLICY. THIS POINT WAS ALL THE CLEARER SINCE THE GROMYKO VISIT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE US STATEMENT POSTPONING ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4213  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
USMISSION BERLIN

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RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. THE FRG WAS ANXIOUS, WHILE SEEMING ACTIVE, TO TRANSFER THE ONUS FOR ACTION FROM ITSELF TO THE THREE POWERS. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS RUNNING ANNOUNCED THAT A THREE POWER DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW WAS IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS KNEW VERY WELL THERE WERE DRAFTING PROBLEMS IN THE BONN GROUP. THE EFFORT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ALLIES IN THIS WAY BOOMERANGED, HOWEVER, AND THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN WAS CONSTRAINED TO SAY SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE THREE POWERS WERE NOT GOING TO LET THEMSELVES BE PUSHED INTO HASTY ACTION--WHEN THE

ONLY ONES PUSHING WERE THE GERMANS THEMSELVES.

4. THE BONN GROUP RECEIVED SOME UNDESERVED BUT WELCOME KUDOS FOR THE EXCELLENT TIMING OF THE STATEMENT PUT OUT BY THE THREE BONN EMBASSIES ON THE EVE OF THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE FEA LEGISLATION. IN FACT, IT WAS A PURE FLUKE THAT THAT DRAFTING EXERCISE ENDED WHEN IT DID. OTHER BONN GROUP ASPECTS WORTH MENTIONING WERE CONFIDENTIAL

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THE UNHAPPINESS EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH OVER OUR BILATERAL APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS IN WASHINGTON (THE GERMANS AND BRITISH WERE MORE RESTRAINED), AND THE FRENCH WISH TO MOVE TOWARD SOME KIND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE FEA AND RELATED MATTERS. ON THIS LAST POINT, INCIDENTALLY, IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHETHER THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, LUSTIG, IS SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF OR HIS AUTHORITIES WHEN HE ADVOCATES FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS. DOES EMBASSY PARIS KNOW THE QUAI'S VIEW ON THIS MATTER?

5. WE ARE NOT PROPHETS OF GLOOM AND DOOM, AND IT WOULD BE MISLEADING TO EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEA "CRISIS". IT WOULD BE EQUALLY WRONG TO MINIMIZE IT. THE SOVIET EFFECTIVELY MADE THE POINT THEY CONSIDERED IMPORTANT, AND THEY CAN NOW FEEL REASONABLY SURE THAT THE FRG AND THE THREE POWERS WILL THINK AT LEAST TWICE BEFORE PUTTING ANOTHER FEDERAL AGENCY INTO BERLIN. (NOT EVERYONE ON THE GERMAN SIDE FEELS PASSIVE, HOWEVER NEUBAUER, DEPUTY OF BERLIN MAYOR SCHUTZ, HAS NOW COME OUT IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING THE GERMAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION IN BERLIN AS A FURTHER DELIBERATE TEST OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENT.) THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN EFFECT DEFINED WHAT THE PERMISSIBLE LEVEL OF FEDERAL PRESENCE IN BERLIN SHOULD BE. MOREOVER, AS IS POINTED OUT IN BERLIN 1287, THEY HAVE IMPOSED SELECTIVE CONTROLS ON TRANSIT TRAFFIC WHEN, IN THEIR VIEW, THE WESTERN POWERS VIOLATED THE QA. THEY HAVE ALSO INTRODUCED THE GDR INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BY ESPOUSING THE GDR CLAIM THAT IT CAN, WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY, TAKE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD ITS INTERESTS. THIS, THEORETICALLY AT LEAST, OPENS A WIDE FIELD FOR THE EAST GERMANS. THEY COULD PRESUMABLY, IF THE SOVIETS PERMITTED, TURN BACK TRAVELERS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY BELONGED TO OTHER FRG AGENCIES WHICH THEY CONSIDERED ILLEGALLY ESTABLISHED IN BERLIN. ONE CANNOT ASSUME A SIMPLE LINEAR EXTRAPOLATION FOR THE FUTURE, AND WE DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS INTEND AT THIS TIME TO LET THE EAST GERMANS MOVE FORWARD, BUT A DISTURBING PRECEDENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISH-

ED, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE MISCHIEF ARE  
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CLEAR.

6. WHAT HAS ONCE AGAIN BEEN MADE EVIDENT IS THAT THE  
GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS OF LIFE FAVOR THE SOVIETS IN THE  
BERLIN CONTEXT, AND THAT THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO USE  
THE PHYSICAL ADVANTAGE WHICH THIS GIVES THEM TO TURN ON  
AND OFF HARASSMENTS IN A CONTROLLED MANNER TO ACHIEVE  
THEIR TACTICAL OBJECTIVES. THEY WILL HAVE NO SCRUPLES  
ABOUT ALLEGING ALLIES INFRACTIONS AS JUSTIFICATION.  
AS IN THE PAST, THE FRG WILL BE RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER  
TAKING ANY EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES OF A KIND  
WHICH IT ALONE IS IN A POSITION TO APPLY, BUT WILL  
INSTEAD TRY TO KEEP ACTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS  
PRIMARILY AT THE THREE-POWER LEVEL.  
HILLENBRAND

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